The Trading Profits of High Frequency Traders (Risk and Return in High Frequency Trading)

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Motivation

- Academic

- Risk
- Competition
- Market Efficiency

- Media

- April 10, 2012 "Many retail and institutional investors believe that as much as \$2 billion annually in high-frequency trading profits are coming out of their own pockets." ~ Bloomberg
- August 8, 2012 "With a high-powered computer and an 'algorithm,' a trader could buy the cheap stock and sell the expensive one almost simultaneously, making an almost risk-free profit for himself." ~Time Magazine

- Regulatory

- Knight Capital
- Competition

Overview of Results

- (1) HFTs are not a homogenous group
- (2) HFTs realize large profits:
 - High profitability
 - Persistent
 - High Sharpe ratios
 - Low average risk
 - Tail risk (?)
- (3) How do HFTs earn their profits
 - From all other trader types
 - Short, but not the shortest, time horizons
 - Decreasing returns to scale
 - Increases with aggressiveness
 - Associated with risk

Data

Asset: September 2010 e-mini S&P 500 futures contract

- Quarterly contract
- Expires third Friday of September

Period: Trading for August 2010

Resolution: Trade-by-trade

- User level buyer and seller id
- Aggressive and passive party

Time: Focus on regular trading hours 8:30am-3:15pm

Classifying Traders

HFT:

- a. high volume (10,000 contracts daily)
- b. low inventory (< 15% of positions held at once)
- c. end the day with near zero positions (<2% of total trading held at close)

Not all HFTs are the same:


- a. Aggressive HFT + take liquidity > 40% of volume
- b. Mixed HFT + take liquidity > 20%, < 40%
- c. Passive HFT + take liquidity < 20%

Classifying Traders

- Non-HFT Market Maker:
 - Take liquidity < 20%, trade > 100 contracts
- Fundamental (Institutional):
 - Trade > 5000 contracts, takes a direction position
- Small (Retail):
 - Trade < 10 contracts
- Opportunistic:
 - Trade a medium or large amount and tend to take timevarying directional positions

Descriptive Statistics

	Daily %	Daily
	Market	Aggressive
Trader	Volume	Ratio
HFT□ (n=10)	25.00%	67.70%
HFT□ (n=11)	15.59%	29.00%
HFT□(n=10)	6.18%	12.60%
Fundamental (n=157)	6.95%	51.10%
Small Trader (n=25150)	0.65%	57.90%
Non-HFT M. M. (n=47)	3.05%	9.10%
Other (n=6008)	42.58%	55.60%
Total (n=31403)	3,187,011	



Profits test 1: Daily Profit Distribution

Panel A: Daily Profit

Fallel A: Da	my Prom			
	N	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.
HFT □	210	\$95,508	\$46,262	\$258,991
$\mathbf{HFT} \square$	229	\$35,562	\$13,825	\$298,187
HFT □	197	\$5,484	\$6,437	\$59,580
HFT	636	\$46,039	\$12,331	\$237,608
Panel B: Da	ily Profit	Per Share		
HFT	210	\$0.89	\$0.98	5.94
$\mathbf{HFT} \square$	229	\$2.08	\$0.53	18.8
HFT □	197	\$0.22	\$0.34	1.9
HFT	636	\$1.11	\$0.53	11.84
HFT Profits				

Observation: Firm-Day Profit

Profits test 2: Profit Consistency

By firm-obs

By # of firms

			% Firms	% Firms	% Firms
	# of Firms-	% Firm-Obs	Profitable	Profitable	Profitable
_	Obs	Profitable	<u>≥</u> 90%	<u>≥</u> 75%	<u>≥</u> 50%
_					
HFT	210	68%	20%	40%	80%
$\mathbf{HFT}\square$	229	76%	9%	54%	100%
HFT	197	71%	10%	70%	80%
HFT	636	74%	13%	55%	87%

Risk – Inventory Control

Panel A: End of Day Inventory

	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Median	Max.
HFT□	210	-12.2	237	-1015	О	1016
$HFT\square$	229	-12.4	639	-3818	O	4312
$HFT\square$	197	-4.3	141	-799	0	814
HFT	636	-9.8	414	-3818	O	4312
Panel B: Max.	Inv. from	0 / Total	Shares Trac	ded		
HFT□	210	2.20%	3.90%	0.30%	1.20%	50%
HFT□	229	2.60%	7.00%	0.10%	1.20%	100%
HFT□	197	1.10%	1.20%	0.20%	0.70%	7.60%
HFT	636	2.00%	4.80%	0.10%	1.00%	100%
HFT Profit	S					

Profits test 3: Sharpe Ratios

$$SR_{i,t} = \frac{r_{i,t} - r_f}{\sigma_i} * \sqrt{252}$$

Panel A: Daily Profit

Unit of Observation: Firm

Mean	25%	Median	75%
8.46	2.3	8.08	13.89
10.46	2.23	13.23	17.11
8.56	1.27	9.47	13.22
9.2	2.23	9.7	13.89
	8.46 10.46 8.56	8.46 2.3 10.46 2.23 8.56 1.27	8.46 2.3 8.08 10.46 2.23 13.23 8.56 1.27 9.47

Panel B: Daily Profit per Share

		1		
$HFT\Box$	8.82	1.02	6.24	18.11
$HFT\square$	11.08	2.21	14.04	20.92
$HFT\Box$	6.51	1.16	7.72	9.87
HFT	8.88	1.16	7.49	17.7

Risk – Realized Losses

	Total Monthly		Max Loss Per
	Profits	Max Loss	Average \$-Profit
$HFT\square$	\$20,056,713	-\$876,938	-\$6.92
$\mathrm{HFT}\square$	\$8,143,800	-\$2,661,600	-\$35.61
$HFT\square$	\$1,080,388	-\$323,163	-\$29.92
HFT	\$29,280,900	-\$2,661,600	-\$35.61

If profits follow an arithmetic brownian motion with constant drift α and constant σ , then:

Probability of Default: P(Default) = $\exp(-2\alpha V_o/\sigma^2)$

Calibrate Model

V = \$10 million

 $\alpha = \$45,000$

 $\sigma = $250,000$

Probability of defaulting within a year = < .01% Probability of breaking equal in a year is > 99.8% Probability of doubling capital in a year is 63%

Conclusion

- 1. HFTs on average provide more liquidity than they take, but there is wide heterogeneity in their liquidity provision
 - How should we think about the different kinds of HFTs? Do we value some types of HFT and not others?
- 2. HFTs earn large, persistent profits, not commensurate with the risk they take
 - On a per trade basis these values are small compared to other intermediaries. Should they be smaller? Do costs (labor, technology, data, etc) explain the profits?
 - Is this a competitive market? Are there barriers to entry? Are there positional externalities?
 - Over time is HFT becoming more competitive / less competitive?
 Are profits increasing / decreasing? Are the same firms maintaining there market position?



From whom do HFTs derive their profits?

Profits/Loss Per Share

	Counterparty								
						Non-HFT			
						Market	Small		
Profits to:	Fundamental	HFT	$HFT\Box$	$HFT\Box$	$HFT\square$	Maker	Trader	Other	Total
Fund.	\$0.00	-\$1.22	-\$1.89	-\$0.55	-\$0.01	\$0.35	\$3.08	\$0.51	-\$0.69
HFT	\$1.22	\$0.00	-\$1.03	\$1.08	\$1.41	\$2.02	\$4.42	\$2.25	\$0.91
HFT	\$1.89	\$1.03	\$0.00	\$1.68	\$2.00	\$2.57	\$4.59	\$2.87	\$1.76
$\mathbf{HFT}\square$	\$0.55	-\$1.08	-\$1.68	\$0.00	\$0.10	\$0.72	\$4.11	\$1.72	\$0.08
HFT	\$0.01	-\$1.41	-\$2.00	-\$0.10	\$0.00	\$1.01	\$4.73	\$1.30	-\$0.34
Mkt maker	r s -\$0.35	-\$2.02	-\$2.57	-\$0.72	-\$1.01	\$0.00	\$5.12	\$1.39	-\$0.82
Small	-\$3.08	-\$4.42	-\$4.59	-\$4.11	-\$4.73	-\$5.12	\$0.00	-\$2.46	-\$3.97
Opport.	-\$0.51	-\$2.25	-\$2.87	-\$1.72	-\$1.30	-\$1.39	\$2.46	\$0.00	-\$1.60

Over what horizon do HFTs earn their profits?

Transaction Interval 1001-10000 1-10 11-100 101-1000 10000+ **HFT**^A \$21,939 \$22,108 \$870 -\$678 -\$5,348 [\$-2825, \$8252] [\$-10887, \$5997] [\$-45231, \$12597] [\$-9633, \$73428] [\$6213, \$44481] HFT^{M} \$12,145 \$23,171 \$8,811 \$21,832 \$8,483 [\$7825, \$19111] [\$12301, \$35883] [\$-5835, \$27894] **[**\$-36494, \$-5288] [\$-13018, \$2360] **HFT**^P \$5,236 \$12,991 \$11,408 -\$7,917 -\$9,774 [\$3840, \$11170] [\$10174, \$20701] [\$7920, \$19186] **(**\$-14282, \$-1512] [\$-20778, \$-6990]

Over what horizon do HFTs earn their profits?

Transaction Interval

	1-10	11-100	101-1000	1001-10000	10000+
	60.00	00.00	00.00	60.99	00.11
HFT ^A	-\$0.32	\$0.86	\$0.26	-\$0.22	\$0.11
TTETM	[-0.59, -0.06]	[0.6, \$1.01]	[-0.41, 0.43]	[-0.4, -0.01]	[0.29, 0.4]
HFT ^M	\$0.01	-\$ 0.39	\$0.72	\$0.75	\$1.09
TTTTT	[-0.27, 0.07]	[-0.65, -0.21]	[-1.04, 0.11]	[-0.07, 1.21]	[0.74, 1.15]
HFT ^P	-\$0.48	-\$0.77	-\$0.15	\$0.90	\$0.82
TTTT	[-0.54, -0.32]	[-1.01, -0.46]	[-0.47, -0.05]		[0.73, 0.94]
HFT	-\$0.29	-\$0.43	-\$0.15	\$0.55	\$0.75
	[-0.53, -0.01]	[-0.77, 0.86]	[-0.71, 0.4]	[-0.24, 0.94]	[0.37, 1.04]

Regression analysis:

Observations over 10-second bins

Dependent variable: Regressors:

Log profits Scale:

Log Firm Volume Log Mkt Volume

Risk:

Volatility

Firm Inventory Range

Log Firm Net Position at start of 10s interval

Aggressiveness:

Permanent aggressiveness Transient aggressiveness

Panel A: Intraday Strategies


α

Log(Firm Volume i,s)

	HFT	$HFT\square$	$HFT\square$	$HFT\square$
	-1.13***	2 4*	671***	-1.29***
	(0.0598)	(0.1170)	(0.1170)	(0.0816)
	.0875***	.0975***	.086***	.115***
•	(0.0039)	(0.0059)	(0.0072)	(0.0085)

Log(Market volume s)

Adj-R² N



Panel A: Intraday Strategies

i anci A. inti aday Strategies				
	HFT	$HFT\square$	$HFT\square$	$HFT\square$
α	-1.13***	 24*	671***	-1.29***
	(0.0598)	(0.1170)	(0.1170)	(0.0816)
Log(Firm Volume _{i,s})	.0875***	.0975***	.0863***	.115***
	(0.0039)	(0.0059)	(0.0072)	(0.0085)
Volatility _s	.224***	.255***	.251***	.153***
	(0.0078)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0105)
Firm Inventory Range□	.488***	.745***	.264***	2.3***
	(0.0301)	(0.0428)	(0.0441)	(0.1150)
Log(Firm Net Position i,s)	.672***	.621***	.689***	.62***
	(0.0041)	(0.0077)	(0.0067)	(0.0068)
Log(Market volume _s)	.115***	.0859***	.121***	.11***
	(0.0068)	(0.0121)	(0.0127)	(0.0099)
AJ; D2	0.560	0.400	0.50	0.545
Adj-R ²	0.569	0.429	0.53	0.547
N	82283	25241	32036	25006

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Volatility _s	.224***	.255***	.251***	.153***
	(0.0078)	(0.0142)	(0.0142)	(0.0105)
Firm Aggressiveness _{i,s}	.297***	.396***	.121***	.238***
	(0.0157)	(0.0235)	(0.0294)	(0.0296)
Firm Avg Aggressiveness□	.634***	-0.0048	-1.14***	.747***
	(0.0233)	(0.0510)	(0.1480)	(0.1030)
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Trading Partners

Passive

					Non-HFT		Small	
Aggressive	$HFT\square$	$HFT\square$	$HFT\square$	Fundamental	Market Maker	Other	Trader	Total
HFT□	4.16%	6.67%	3.33%	2.71%	1.83%	14.53%	0.21%	33.43%
	(5.35%)	(7.41%)	(3.64%)	(2.41%)	(1.84%)	(12.60%)	(0.17%)	
$HFT\square$	1.25%	1.52%	0.90%	0.79%	0.54%	4.12%	0.07%	9.20%
	(1.47%)	(2.04%)	(1.00%)	(0.66%)	(0.51%)	(3.47%)	(0.05%)	
HFT□	0.26%	0.35%	0.17%	0.12%	0.07%	0.58%	0.01%	1.55%
	(0.25%)	(0.34%)	(0.17%)	(0.11%)	(0.09%)	(0.58%)	(0.01%)	
Fundamental	1.41%	1.66%	0.81%	0.53%	0.37%	2.39%	0.03%	7.20%
	(1.15%)	(1.59%)	(0.78%)	(0.52%)	(0.40%)	(2.71%)	(0.04%)	
Non-HFT M.M	0.12%	0.16%	0.07%	0.03%	0.02%	0.16%	0.00%	0.56%
	(0.09%)	(0.12%)	(0.06%)	(0.04%)	(0.03%)	(0.21%)	(0.00%)	
Other	8.68%	11.56%	5.51%	3.00%	2.65%	15.73%	0.21%	47.35%
	(7.57%)	(10.49%)	(5.16%)	(3.41%)	(2.61%)	(17.85%)	(0.25%)	
Small Trader	0.12%	0.22%	0.10%	0.03%	0.04%	0.20%	0.00%	0.71%
	(0.11%)	(0.16%)	(0.08%)	(0.05%)	(0.04%)	(0.27%)	(0.00%)	
Total	16.00%	22.16%	10.90%	7.21%	5.52%	37.70%	0.52%	35,057,121

Over what horizon do HFTs earn their profits?

Transaction Interval

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HFT	[-0.54, -0.32] - \$0.29	[-1.01, -0.46] - \$0.43	[-0.47, -0.05] - \$0.15	[0.74, 1.2] \$0.55	[0.73, 0.94] \$0.75
111, 1			_	_	
	[-0.53, -0.01]	[-0.77, 0.86]	[-0.71, 0.4]	[-0.24, 0.94]	[0.37, 1.04]

Motivation

"A market is efficient with respect to information set θ_t if it is impossible to make economic profits by trading on the basis of information set θ_t "

~Jensen, 1978

"Prices reflect the information of informed individuals (arbitrageurs) but only partially, so that those who expend resources to obtain information do receive compensation."

~Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980

Discussion

The results lend themselves to multiple directions: Which way should I go?

- Market Efficiency (Grossman-Stiglitz)
- Equilibrium model
- Tail Risk
- Heterogeneity
- -- Competition
- -- barriers to entry
- -- arms race: positional externalities
- Incentives / Organization structure