

A Portfolio Model of Quantitative Easing

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25th Annual Bank of Canada Conference

**Unconventional Monetary Policies:
A Small Open Economy Perspective**

Bank of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario
November 4, 2016

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- The transmission of QE to long rates is not well understood, conceptually and empirically.
- Notably, the existing literature lacks accounting for
 - The special features of central bank reserves;
 - The role of commercial banks for transmission.
- Transmission details matter for how to best design, calibrate, communicate, and exit QE programs.

- We develop a portfolio model that contains the assets and liabilities of the central bank and of reserve-holding commercial banks.
- Two financial frictions, *imperfect substitutability* and *segmentation of the market for central bank reserves*, lead to two distinct portfolio balance effects:
 - Standard **supply-induced effects** due to lower available supply of the purchased assets;
 - Novel **reserve-induced effects** that are independent of the assets acquired.
- Key implication: Financial market structure and banking regulations matter for transmission.

- 1 Background and intuition
- 2 The portfolio model
- 3 Equilibrium bond price effect of QE
- 4 Empirical relevance
- 5 Concluding thoughts

Existing Models Omit Important Aspects of QE

- 1 Signaling channel: Announcements of QE inform about future economic conditions or monetary policy intentions.
- 2 Supply-induced portfolio balance channel: CB purchases of long-term bonds reduce the supply of these in the market, thereby increasing their price.
- What about the role of reserves in QE?
 - Only banks can hold central bank reserves.
 - Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) argue that an expansion of reserves by itself can lead to portfolio balance effects.
 - Christensen and Krogstrup (2016) find empirical support for portfolio balance effects on long bond prices from reserve expansions.
 - Vayanos and Vila (2009) have no role for reserves or banks.

Intuition for Reserve-Induced Effects (1)


Banks	
<u>Assets</u>	<u>Liabilities</u>
Reserves ↑	Equity
Short bonds ↓	Deposits ↑
Long bonds	Other debt
Other assets	

Central Bank	
<u>Assets</u>	<u>Liabilities</u>
Short bonds ↑	Equity
Long bonds	Reserves ↑
Other assets	Other liabilities

Non-Bank Financial Firms	
<u>Assets</u>	<u>Liabilities</u>
Deposits ↑	Equity
Short bonds ↓	Debt
Long Bonds	
Other assets	

- Example where central bank purchases short bonds in exchange for reserves.
- Traditional view: No effect at ZLB because short bonds and money are perfect substitutes.

Intuition for Reserve-Induced Effects (2)



- Initial impact of QE: Bank asset duration is shortened.
- The extra reserves must stay in banks: Hot potato effect....
- ... until longer-duration yields decline (prices increase) enough to make banks content to hold the extra reserves.

One-period portfolio model of asset market equilibrium.

- Three types of actors:
 - A central bank (*CB*);
 - A continuum of reserve holding commercial banks (*B*);
 - A continuum of non-bank financial firms (*NB*).
- Three types of assets:
 - Long bonds, L , with the price of P_L and $TP = 1 - P_L > 0$;
 - Central bank reserves, R , with the price of one (numeraire);
 - Bank deposits, D , with the price of one.

Central bank balance sheet:

- $P_L L_{CB} = E_{CB} + R.$
 - L_{CB} is the central bank's holdings of the long bond;
 - E_{CB} is the value of the central bank's initial equity;
 - R is the amount of outstanding reserves.

Policy tool:

Bond purchases, $P_L dL_{CB}$, paid for with reserves, dR , while equity is determined as a residual from bond price changes

- $dE_{CB} = dP_L L_{CB} + P_L dL_{CB} - dR.$

Model - Non-Bank financial firms

Non-bank financial firm j 's balance sheet:

- $P_L L_{NB}^j + D_{NB}^j = E_{NB}^j$.
 - L_{NB}^j is firm j 's holdings of the long bond;
 - D_{NB}^j is its holdings of bank deposits;
 - E_{NB}^j is its initial equity value.

Non-bank financial firms balance their liquid portfolio and demand positive amounts of both deposits and bonds:

- $L_{NB}^j = f_{NB}(P_L, E_{NB}^j)$;
- $\frac{\partial f_{NB}}{\partial P_L} < 0$, i.e., normal downward sloping bond demand;
- $\frac{\partial f_{NB}}{\partial E_{NB}} = 0$, no immediate reaction to changes in equity value.

The demand for deposits is determined as a residual:

- $D_{NB}^j = E_{NB}^j - P_L f_{NB}(P_L, E_{NB}^j)$.

Model - Depository Banks

Depository bank i 's balance sheet:

- $R^i + P_L L_B^i = E_B^i + D_B^i$.
 - L_B^i is bank i 's holdings of the long bond;
 - R^i is its holdings of central bank reserves;
 - D_B^i is the bank's deposit funding;
 - E_B^i is its initial equity value.

Depository banks' demand for bonds:

- $L_B^i = f_B(P_L, E_B^i + D_B^i)$.

Central assumptions:

- $\frac{\partial f_B}{\partial P_L} < 0 \Rightarrow$ bond is a normal good, imperfect substitutability;
- $0 < \frac{\partial f_B}{\partial D_B^i} < 1 \Rightarrow$ "Maturity transformation" assumption.

The demand for reserves is determined as a residual:

- $R_B^i = E_B^i + D_B^i - P_L f_B(P_L, E_B^i + D_B^i)$.

- We assume a continuum of identical banks and non-banks normalized to 1 \Rightarrow We can drop superscripts.
- Equilibrium: The bond price that ensures aggregate demand for bonds from banks and non-banks equals total supply of bonds net of central bank holdings.
- Comparative statics: We analyze the change in the equilibrium bond price associated with a QE transaction

$$dL_{CB} = -dL_B - dL_{NB} > 0.$$

- What happens?

Model Solution with One Traded Security

Change in the equilibrium bond price due to a QE transaction:

$$\bullet \frac{dP_L}{dL_{CB}} = \frac{-1}{\frac{\partial f_B}{\partial P_L} + \frac{\partial f_{NB}}{\partial P_L} \left(1 - P_L \frac{\partial f_B}{\partial D_B}\right)} > 0.$$

Deposits respond to central bank purchases as follows

$$\bullet \frac{dD_B}{dL_{CB}} = -P_L \frac{\partial f_{NB}}{\partial P_L} \times \frac{dP_L}{dL_{CB}} \geq 0.$$

Impact depends on:

- The asset price sensitivity of the bond demand;
- Banks' propensity to engage in maturity transformation.

Corner Solution with only Banks Selling Bonds

- For intuition, consider the special case where non-banks have inelastic demand for bonds: $\frac{\partial f_{NB}}{\partial P_L} = 0$.
- $\frac{dP_L}{dL_{CB}} = \frac{-1}{\frac{\partial f_B}{\partial P_L}} > 0$.
- $\frac{dD_B}{dL_{CB}} = 0$.

The reserve-induced effect shuts down, but supply-induced effects continue to exist.

Corner Solution with only Non-Banks Selling Bonds

- Now, consider the other extreme where banks have inelastic demand for bonds: $\frac{\partial f_B}{\partial P_L} = 0$.

- $$\frac{dP_L}{dL_{CB}} = \frac{-1}{\frac{\partial f_{NB}}{\partial P_L} \left(1 - P_L \frac{\partial f_B}{\partial D_B} \right)} > 0.$$

- $$\frac{dD_B}{dL_{CB}} = \frac{P_L}{1 - P_L \frac{\partial f_B}{\partial D_B}} > 0.$$

The reserve-induced effect arises, amplifying the supply-induced effect.

Summary of Model Findings


- When non-banks' demand for bonds is sensitive to bond prices, reserve-induced portfolio balance effects arise and amplify the transmission of QE.
- Model with two traded securities in addition to reserves and deposits confirm findings, but is less tractable (see paper).
- Reserve-induced effects on long bond yields or other asset prices are independent of the assets purchased.

Have reserve-induced effects been empirically relevant in QE programs?

- For identification of reserve effects independently of supply effects, we need QE-style central bank reserve expansions in the absence of long-term bond purchases.
- The Swiss reserve expansion program of August 2011 represents a unique natural experiment.
- Christensen and Krogstrup (2016) analyze the announcement responses and present supporting evidence.
- Event studies of U.S. and U.K. QE programs cannot separately identify reserve effects, but circumstances make them likely.

Empirical Relevance of Reserve-Induced Effects (2)

- Data on bank total liabilities - except for QE1, U.S. banks have tended to see an expansion of their balance sheets in tandem with Fed asset purchases.



- We develop a portfolio model of the transmission of QE to asset prices that takes the roles of central bank reserves and depository banks into account.
- PB effects come in two forms, supply- and reserve-induced.
- Characteristics of reserve-induced effects:
 - Independent of the assets the central bank is purchasing.
 - Importance depends on financial market structure, banks' preferences, and their portfolio constraints (regulation).
 - Empirically relevant, likely to have played a role in the transmission of QE2 and QE3.

- Implications for design and transmission of QE programs
 - Which assets to buy? Not necessary to buy long-dated securities to affect long-term yields.
 - Financial institutional framework and counterparties matter. Who has access to reserves?
 - Role of regulation in transmission: bank leverage constraints and portfolio risk management tools employed by non-banks both are likely to matter.
- Implications for the exit
 - A “naive” exit from QE through absorption of reserves without asset sales could still affect/disrupt long-term bond markets.