

“THE OPTIMAL INFLATION TARGET AND THE
NATURAL RATE OF INTEREST” BY ANDRADE, GALI,
LE BIHAN, AND MATHERON

Discussion by
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November 1, 2018

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CONTRIBUTION

- 1 Estimated new Keynesian model with
 - ▶ endogenous ZLB
 - ▶ nominal wage rigidity
- 2 Uncover new relationship between π^* and r^*
 - ▶ Not one-for-one: for reasonable r^* , slope ≈ -0.9 .
 - ▶ Slope does not vary much with source of variation in r^* .
 - ▶ Robust to permutations (model uncertainty, large shocks,...).

WHY IS SLOPE = -1 THE BENCHMARK?

- Welfare function that is only a function of the steady state nominal rate:

$$W(\bar{i}) = W(r^* + \bar{\pi})$$

- ▶ E.g., cost of binding ZLB constraint.

- Optimal inflation solves (assuming interior solution):

$$W_i(r^* + \pi^*(r^*)) \equiv 0$$

- The derivative of this policy function is -1:

$$W_{ii}(r^* + \pi^*(r^*))[1 + \pi_r^*(r^*)] = 0$$

WHY IS SLOPE = -1 THE BENCHMARK?

- In most models, welfare is also a function of the level of inflation,

$$W(\bar{i}, \bar{\pi}) = W(r^* + \bar{\pi}, \bar{\pi})$$

- ▶ E.g., cost of price dispersion.
- Optimal inflation solves:

$$W_i(r^* + \pi^*(r^*), \pi^*(r^*)) + W_\pi(r^* + \pi^*(r^*), \pi^*(r^*)) \equiv 0$$

- Assuming $W_{i\pi} = 0$, the derivative of this policy function is,

$$\pi_r^*(r^*) = -\frac{W_{ii}}{W_{ii} + W_{\pi\pi}}$$

- ▶ Usually, $W_{ii} < 0$ and $W_{\pi\pi} < 0$, so slope greater than -1.


IS CONSTANT SLOPE ≈ -0.9 SURPRISING?

- Suggests $W_{ii} \approx 9W_{\pi\pi}$.
- $W_{ii} \approx 9W_{\pi\pi}$ also in robustness checks (e.g., model uncertainty).
- Constant slope \Rightarrow Welfare function approximately quadratic in (\bar{i}, π) when evaluated at π^* .
- Ex ante, I would call these results surprising.

HOW GENERAL/ROBUST IS CONSTANT SLOPE = -0.9 ?

- Within U.S. and E.U. non-trivial differences.
 - ▶ U.S.: slope = $-0.99 \Rightarrow W_{ii} \approx 99W_{\pi\pi}$
 - ▶ E.A.: slope = $-0.8 \Rightarrow W_{ii} \approx 4W_{\pi\pi}$.
 - ▶ Paper attributes differences in slope to differences in price indexation: 0.2 in U.S. and 0.12 in E.U.
- \Rightarrow Why are such small differences so important for the slope?
- Welfare is evaluated using quadratic approximation in trend inflation.
 - \Rightarrow Compare to Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Wieland (2012).

(π^*, r^*) IN CGW (2012)




- Slope varies from -0.57 to -0.68 .

ESTIMATION

- How much information is in the 1985-2008 sample?
 - ▶ For most parameters posterior standard deviation \approx prior standard deviation.
 - ▶ Only 3 structural parameters with $> 25\%$ reduction in standard deviation.


⇒ Parameter uncertainty exercise largely driven by prior choices.
- With flat likelihood, paper should do more to justify prior (mean and variance).
 - ▶ E.g., price indexation priors may be too high/tight.

ZLB DISTRIBUTION




- AR(1) shocks \Rightarrow Geometric distribution

ZLB DISTRIBUTION



- CCGW (2016): regime-switching \Rightarrow more uniform.

(π^*, r^*) IN CCGW (2016)



- Slope ≈ -0.48 .

SUMMARY

- Would want to know better what makes the (r^*, π^*) slope so large in the benchmark model.
- Slope in AGLBM may be inflated due to the counterfactual ZLB distribution with AR(1) shocks.
- Other abstractions may be important: unconventional monetary policy (e.g., Debortoli, Gali, and Gambetti, 2018).
- Slope looks largely constant, but magnitude appears to vary quite a bit across models—ranges from -0.48 to -0.99 .

STILL MORE TO DO

- Both main costs and main benefits of higher inflation come from price dispersion.

- We now have models with substantial costs of business cycles not coming from price dispersion (e.g. McKay and Reis, 2017).