

# Discussion of “Falling Interest Rates and Misallocation: Lessons from General Equilibrium” by Asriyan, Laeven, Martin, Van der Gucht, and Vanasco

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May 2021

# Falling interest rates and misallocation

Secular decline in interest rates in recent decades. Many causes

Conventional wisdom: Low rates stimulate investment and output

Growing concern that low rates can create misallocation, zombies...

This paper: Low rates can induce **inefficient** misallocation **through GE**

**Discussion:** Simpler version to illustrate forces and **policy implications**

# Model: Het. productivity and borrowing constraints

Two periods 0, 1. Single consumption good. Preferences  $E_0 [c_1]$

**Small open economy:** Can borrow and lend at the gross rate  $R$

**Entrepreneurs (E):** Production function  $Ak$

- **Two types:**  $A \in \{A_L, A_H\}$  with unit mass and endowment  $w_L, w_H$
- **Borrowing constraint:** Only fraction,  $\lambda$ , of output is pledgeable

Capital producers with a convex cost  $\chi(k) \implies$  Capital supply  $K^S(q)$

# Equilibrium conditions: Marginal E has low productivity

Suppose H-types are constrained ( $w_H$  is low). Equilibrium:

- **L-types are marginal. They determine the price of capital:**

$$q = \frac{A_L}{R}$$

- Capital market clearing: There is  $\tilde{w}_L < w_L$  such that:

$$\underbrace{\frac{w_H}{q - \lambda \frac{A_H}{R}}}_{k_H} + \underbrace{\frac{\tilde{w}_L}{q - \lambda \frac{A_L}{R}}}_{k_L} = K^S(q).$$

- **H-types' investment determines productivity:**

$$Y_H = A_L K^S(q) + (A_H - A_L) k_H$$

# Low $R$ has competing effects on output and productivity

$$k_H = \frac{w_H}{q - \lambda \frac{A_H}{R}} \text{ where } q = \frac{A_L}{R} \text{ and } K^S(q)$$

- 1 Low  $R$  expands  $K^S(q)$  (**greater “neoclassical” investment**)
- 2 Low  $R$  enables H-types to expand more (**improved allocation**)
- 3 Low  $R$  raises  $q$  and induces H-types to shrink (**misallocation**)

# Low $R$ can reduce output if misallocation is severe

Special case with inelastic supply ( $K^S(q) = 1$ ) and  $\lambda < \frac{A_L}{A_H}$ :

$$Y_H = A_L + (A_H - A_L) k_H \text{ where } k_H = \frac{w_H}{q - \lambda \frac{A_H}{R}} = \frac{w_H R}{A_L - \lambda A_H}$$

Low  $R$  can even **decrease the output!**

## Inefficient congestion on H-types via **GE pecuniary externality**:

- Social NPV of  $k_L$  is negative, even though private  $NPV \geq 0$
- Different than efficient allocation to less productive firms
- Different than inefficiencies in PE (MH, evergreening/reach for yield)

Extends to a **surprise rates** changes in a dynamic setting

- Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) “balance sheet” externalities are temporary
- Productive Es are (eventually) net buyers of capital/factors

**Suggestion:** Extend to **broader factors**. Congestion via wages/rents

# Normative result: Targeted policies can improve welfare

Paper considers **targeted interventions** based on Es productivity

- Planner respects budget and borrowing constraints but chooses  $\{k_A\}_A$
- Suppose planner sets binding limit  $\bar{k}_L$ . Problem with inelastic supply

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\bar{k}_L} & A_L + (A_H - A_L) k_H + (w_H + w_L) R \\ \text{s.t. } & k_H = \frac{w}{q - \lambda \frac{A_H}{R}} = 1 - \bar{k}_L \end{aligned}$$

- Set  $\bar{k}_L = 0$  and  $k_H = 1$ . Avoid misallocation and maximize output!

**How about non-targeted interventions, e.g., “monetary policy”?**



# Raising the interest rate can improve welfare

- Suppose planner subsidizes savings  $R + \tau$ 
  - Financed with lump-sum period-1 taxes on each E
- Planner's problem with inelastic supply:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\tau} W &= A_L + (A_H - A_L) k_H + (w_H + w_L) R \\ \text{s.t. } k_H &= \frac{w}{q - \lambda \frac{A_H}{R + \tau}} \leq 1 \text{ and } q = \frac{A_L}{R + \tau} \end{aligned}$$

- Set  $\tau$  so that  $k_H = 1$ . Avoid misallocation and maximize output!

**Result generalizes to elastic supply:** This model still has  $\left. \frac{dW}{d\tau} \right|_{\tau=0} > 0$

- Second-order distortion on capitalists' surplus,  $(qK^S - \chi(K^S)) R$

# “Prudential” monetary policy ( $R > R^*$ ) can improve welfare

Can extend result to monetary policy (closed economy + nominal rigidity)

- Raising  $R$  has macro costs: reduces aggregate demand & output
- But the macro costs are second order at the efficient factor utilization (Caballero-Simsek (2020) “Prudential Monetary Policy”)

Aside: Macroprudential policy,  $\bar{\lambda} \leq \lambda$ , tends to worsen misallocation

- Binds relatively more for H-types than L-types
- Some support for monetary policy in favor of macroprudential policy!

# Conclusion: Intuitive and policy-relevant mechanism

Elegant model with a very intuitive mechanism. Two conditions:

- **L-types are marginal** and determine the price of scarce factors
- **H-types are constrained** and determine aggregate productivity

⇒ **GE congestion. Social NPV < Private NPV.** Low rates can hurt

Some suggestions:

- Focus on **welfare** not output.  $W$  declines under weaker conditions
- Given competing effects (on allocation), empirical evidence would help
  - Plan is reasonable: Interact low rates with land supply elasticity
- Broaden the argument to facilitate new empirical approaches:
  - **Factors beyond capital/land.** Skilled labor, commodities...
  - Heterogeneity in **rate-sensitivity** of capital: residential/nonresidential